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CHINA’S DEFENSE OF ITS HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICIES
By Daniel C.K. Chow
Although the United States has launched repeated attacks on China’s human rights policies for
the past three decades, China’s Communist Party has mounted an effective defense and
counterattack that has resonated with China’s citizens, the most important constituency for the
Party. Without the trust and support of its citizens, the Party will lose its power. China has
mounted this defense based on three prongs: tradition, law, and morality.
Appealing to traditional Confucian doctrine, the Party portrays itself as an authoritarian but
benevolent patriarch. In the area of law, China, a skillful litigator in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), has overturned the first wave of punitive tariffs imposed by the Trump
Administration. China has also gained the higher moral ground. Cleverly using arguments first
raised by politicians and others in the United States, China claims that the United States has
engaged in human rights abuses far more egregious than any in China.
For the past three decades, the United States has attempted to pressure or cajole China into
progress in its human rights policies without success. Meanwhile, China the tiger cub has grown
into China the tiger. The United States must finally accept the sober realization that it is unlikely
to influence significant positive change in China’s human rights policies. Criticism of China’s
human rights policies can realistically only serve two purposes: it can justify sanctions against
China in other areas, such as trade, the environment, and the military. This appears to have been
the strategy of the Trump Administration, which advanced a new view of China as the arch
villain of the modern world. Otherwise, criticism will serve a symbolic purpose only. Only with
this sober recognition can the United States and the Biden Administration approach its
relationship with China now and in the future with realistic expectations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States sustained repeated attacks on the
human rights policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or
China) for three decades, China has been able to mount a highly
effective defense of its policies with the constituency that matters most
to the Communist Party of China (CPC or Party), the nation’s rulers.
This constituency consists of the citizens of China, without whose
support and confidence the CPC would ultimately lose its seat of
power.1 Not only has the CPC been able to shield itself from U.S.
attacks, the Party has also hardened its grip on the country and
solidified its power, all without any slackening of the restrictive
measures employed by the Party on China’s own citizens.2 How China
has been able to achieve this impressive feat can be attributed to the
political skill of the Party in understanding U.S. political and cultural
1
Mike Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, Communist China and the Free
World’s Future, (July 24, 2020) (“The CCP fears the Chinese people’s honest
opinions more than any foe.”). Like all of the emperors of China before it, the Party
realizes that it holds the Mandate of Heaven, i.e. legitimate power, only so long as it
bestows protection and beneficence on its citizens; if the Party, as emperor, descends
into tyranny and moral decay, it will lose the Mandate of Heaven and be deposed
from the throne by a challenger who will receive a new Mandate of Heaven. See infra
Part III.A.
2 See infra Part II.B.3.
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movements, its appeal to Chinese tradition and history, its use of the
law of the WTO, and its savvy use of the PRC media to promulgate a
counter-message to the citizenry of China.3
The historical U.S. approach towards human rights in Chinese
policies can be divided into three periods. The first period, from 1989
to 2000, was marked by largely unsuccessful attempts by the U.S.
Congress to condition trade benefits for China with progress in human
rights.4 This period started with the Tiananmen Square uprising in
1989, when units of the People’s Liberation Army killed thousands of
unarmed Chinese citizens protesting peacefully for political reform and
liberalization.5 Shocked by this event, the U.S. Congress attempted to
pressure China into reforming its human rights policies.6 Under
President Bill Clinton, the United States adopted a short-lived policy
of linking Most Favored Nation (MFN) status which entitled China to
trade benefits, to progress in human rights.7 U.S. policy underwent a
major shift during this period when Clinton decided that constructive
engagement with China, rather than conditioning MFN on progress in
human rights, was the path to political liberalization and reform in
China.8 Clinton successfully urged the U.S. Congress to support
China’s entry into the WTO on the grounds that China’s economic

See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.A.
5 See Tiananmen Protest Death Toll ‘Was 10,000’, BBC (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42465516.
6 See infra Part II.A.1.
7 See infra Part II.A.1. The MFN is contained in Article I of the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and is considered a fundamental obligation of the
World Trade Organization. GATT, Art. 1 provides in relevant part: “With customs
duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or
exportation . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The result of the MFN principle is that it
universalizes any trade benefit by requiring that a benefit given by a WTO member
to any country must be extended to all members of the WTO.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 107–10.
3
4
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reforms required by the WTO would lead to political reform and
greater protection of human rights.9
The second period began in 2001 when China joined the
WTO10 and obtained permanent MFN status as a matter of WTO
law.11 China’s entry into the WTO ended the United States’ threat of
trade sanctions and began the use of engagement through the use of
trade and investment to foster greater openness and economic reform
that would lead to political reform.12 During this period, Presidents
Clinton, Bush, and Obama made human rights a central issue in the
U.S. relationship with China.13 Soon after China’s entry into the WTO,
it became apparent that China was intent on increasing state control of
every aspect of Chinese society, not on relaxing state control.14 With
the elevation of Xi Jinping to the presidency of China in 2012, the CPC
began to significantly harden its stance on human rights and adopt
repressive measures to provide state control over all aspects of Chinese
society.15 Symbolic of this toughened stance was Xi’s elimination of
term limits of the office of the presidency, installing himself as China’s
leader for life.16
The third and current period began in 2016 with the ascension
of Donald J. Trump to the U.S. presidency. The Trump Administration
marked a sharp break with previous administrations in its assessment
of China. The Trump Administration portrayed China as a malevolent
See infra text accompanying notes 118–19.
China became a member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. China and
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited Oct.
277, 2021).
11
The MFN principle is contained in GATT, Art. I, which requires MFN
treatment as a matter of right for every member of the WTO. See GATT, supra note
7, art. 1 (General Most Favored Nation Treatment).
12 See infra Part II.B.
13
Every U.S. president starting with George H.W. Bush made human rights
a central issue until President Donald J. Trump. See infra Part III.C.
14 See infra Part II.B.
15 See infra Part II.B.
16
James Doubek, China Removes Presidential Term Limits, Enabling Xi Jinping to
Rule
Indefinitely,
NPR
(Mar.
11,
2018,
7:42
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/11/592694991/chinaremoves-presidential-term-limits-enabling-xi-jinping-to-rule-indefinitely.
9
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and ruthless superpower intent on displacing the United States as the
leading power in the world through any means possible, without any
legal or ethical constraints.17 China is portrayed as a nation that cheats
in trade, that steals U.S. technology and intellectual property, that has
military ambitions in Asia and possibly beyond, and that violates the
human rights of its own people.18 The Trump Administration
portrayed China as the number one threat to the United States in both
the military and economic spheres.19 According to Peter Navarro,
Trump’s special advisor on trade and a notorious China skeptic, “One
of the great achievements of Donald J. Trump was to bring to the fore
this concept of China as a significant, existential threat to this
country.”20
Under the Trump Administration, human rights were no
longer treated as a discrete issue central to the United States-China
relationship. Instead, human rights were treated as another example of
China’s sins to create and support the United States’ portrayal of China
as the arch-villain of the modern world.21
The Trump Administration acknowledged the failure of
previous administrations’ policies of engagement when it claimed for
the first time that “the United States erred in supporting China’s entry
into the WTO.”22 The policy of engagement failed because China
See infra Part II.C
See infra Part II.C.
19 See infra Part II.C.
20
Angelica Stable, Navarro: ‘We Are All China Hawks’ Because of Trump, FOX
NEWS (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/navarro-we-are-allchina-hawks-because-of-trump.
21
Andrew Leung, How Can the U.S. Offer a Realistic Response to the ‘China
Challenge’,
SOUTH
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Feb.
26,
2021),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3123035/how-us-can-offerrealistic-response-china-challenge (“With strong bipartisan consensus, China has
become America’s arch-enemy. It is thought to be undermining the US-led liberal
order, seeking to supplant the United States as the regional, if not world, hegemon.
Its ideology, economic practices and assertive behaviour are trampling on the values
of human rights, fair play and regional stability.”).
22
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S
WTO
COMPLIANCE
(2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WTO
%20Report.pdf.
17
18
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refused to fulfill its WTO commitments to undergo economic reform
and to loosen the Party’s control on China’s economy.23 Instead, China
reaped all of the benefits of WTO membership without keeping its end
of the bargain and thus was able to exploit and take advantage of trade
with the United States, harming it in the process. 24 The focus of the
Trump Administration shifted away from human rights in China to
directly addressing the unfair trade advantages that China acquired in
its relationship with the United States.25 To directly address China’s
illegal trade practices, the Trump Administration announced a series
of draconian measures that amounted to tariffs on $500 billion dollars
of Chinese imports, or virtually all imports from China.26 Trump also
imposed punitive tariffs on imports from other nations to correct years
of unfair trade deals entered into by prior U.S. administrations.27
The Trump Administration appeared to use arguments about
China’s human rights record to support its portrayal of China as a
powerful and evil adversary.28 Previous U.S. administrations believed
that it was possible to induce constructive changes in China’s treatment
of human rights.29 Under the policy of conditionality from 1989 to
2000, the reasoning was that imposing conditions on China in
exchange for MFN status would effect change in China’s human rights
policies.30 Under the policy of engagement from 2001–2016, China’s
economic reforms, adopted through its interactions with the West,
would lead to political reform.31 The Trump Administration, however,
did not have a coherent policy on how to induce positive change in
China’s human rights policies. Rather, the goal of the Trump
Administration appeared to be to attack and thwart China in every area
possible: trade, international organizations, military ambitions, and
Id.
Id.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 148–56.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 152–56.
27 See Scott Horsley, Trump Formally Orders On Steel, Aluminum Imports, NPR
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591744195/trump-expected-toformally-order-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-imports (noting the United States imposes
tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from all countries except Canada and Mexico).
28 See infra Part II.C.
29 See infra Part II.A–B.
30 See infra Part II.A.
31 See infra Part II.B.
23
24
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even China’s own internal policies.32 China’s human rights abuses were
simply another area in which the country must be punished, but there
was no theory on how to induce constructive change. To punish China,
the Trump Administration instituted numerous trade sanctions against
China for human rights violations.33 On January 14, 2020, during the
waning days of his tenure, Trump imposed a total trade ban on Chinese
tomato and cotton imports that were the products of forced labor in
Xinjiang Province.34
The election of Joe Biden to the U.S. Presidency in 2020 is not
likely to mark a fundamental change in U.S. policy towards China.35
President Biden has already announced that he intends to keep all of
the Trump Administration’s tariffs on China in place,36 and the Biden
Administration is under pressure to keep a tough stance on China.37
The Trump Administration’s portrayal of China as a malevolent
superpower seems to have gained traction with both political parties in
the United States.38

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
34 See infra Part II.C.
35
Jacob M. Schlesinger, What’s Biden’s New China Policy? It Looks a Lot Like
Trump’s, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-bidenschina-policy-it-looks-a-lot-like-trumps-11599759286.
36 Biden Says Will Not Kill Phase 1 Trade Deal with China Immediately: NYT,
REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradechina/biden-says-will-not-kill-phase-1-trade-deal-with-china-immediately-nytidUSKBN28C0HV.
37
Biden has vowed to “pursue policies targeting China’s ‘abusive practices,’
such as ‘stealing intellectual property, dumping products, illegal subsidies to
corporations’ and forcing ‘tech transfers’ from U.S. companies to Chinese
counterparts.” Id.
38 See Ryan Hass, Lessons from the Trump Administration’s Policy Experiment on
China,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Sept.
25,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/lessons-from-the-trump-administrationspolicy-experiment-on-china/; see also Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, & Christine Huang,
Republicans See China More Negatively Than Democrats, Even as Criticism Rises in Both
Parties, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 30, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/07/30/republicans-see-china-more-negatively-than-democrats-even-ascriticism-rises-in-both-parties/.
32
33
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Throughout the entirety of these three periods spanning three
decades, there was no noticeable progress in Chinese human rights by
U.S. standards. To the contrary, in recent years, China has taken
increasingly draconian measures on human rights. In 2020, China
implemented anti-sedition laws against the pro-democracy protesters
in Hong Kong,39 which is in breach of China’s commitment to allow
autonomy for Hong Kong as a condition of the return of Hong Kong
by the UK to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.40 In addition, China has
escalated the use of coercive tactics against the Uighur minorities in
Xinjiang Province by using advanced technology data collection and
analytics to monitor their movements.41 In 2017, China installed large
new “reeducation” camps for over 1.5 million Uighurs out of a total
population of about 10 million.42 Yet, despite these measures, the Party
continues to enjoy the strong support of citizens in China.43 In fact, as
Zhonhua renmin gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia
anquan fa
(中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法) [Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
June 30, 2020, effective June 30, 2020); English Translation of the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, XINHUA (June 30, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202007/01/c_139178753.htm; see Chris Buckley & Keith Bradsher, Brushing Aside
Opponents, Beijing Imposes Security Law on Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/world/asia/china-critics-security-lawhong-kong.html.
40
Convention of Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, ChinaGr. Brit., June 9, 18981989, 90 Brit. For. St. Pap. 17, 186 Consol. T.S. 310; see also
Harry Harding, The Future of Hong Kong, 12 CHINA BUS. REV. 31, 32 (1985).
41
Jane Wakefield, AI Emotion-Detection Software Tested on Uyghurs, BBC NEWS
(May 26, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuelscrackdown-minority-region (discussing how AI software is used to detected changes
in facial expressions that government officials consider suspicious and justification
for detention and torture of suspects).
42
Patrick deHahn, More Than 1 Million Muslims Are Detained in China—But
How
Did
We
Get
That
Number?,
QUARTZ
(July
4,
2019),
https://qz.com/1599393/how-researchers-estimate-1-million-uyghurs-aredetained-in-xinjiang/; Stephanie Nebehay, 1.5 Million Muslims Could Be Detained in
China’s Xinjiang, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-xinjiang-rights/1-5-million-muslims-could-be-detained-in-chinas-xinjiangacademic-idUSKCN1QU2MQ.
43 See infra notes 209–17.
39
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the United States has escalated its attacks, the citizens of China have
rallied to increase its support of the PRC government.44
China’s ability to withstand and deflect U.S. criticism is due to
a shrewd campaign launched by the Party to deliver a counter message
to its citizens. This campaign by the Party consists of using a threepronged approach based on tradition, law, and politics. Observers may
question the validity or credibility of this approach and its supporting
arguments. Critics may also lament the gullibility and naiveté of
Chinese citizens in their pliant acceptance of Party propaganda. The
purpose of this Article is not to condemn or defend the approach, but
to explain why it has been effective with China’s citizenry to counter
U.S. critique of China’s human rights record and what lessons the
United States can draw.
First, the CPC portrays itself as a loyal disciple of Chinese
tradition, historically destined as the legitimate ruler of China.45 The
CPC professes itself as a devotee of Confucianism, a social and
political theory which can be traced to the philosopher Confucius, who
lived 2,500 years ago.46 Confucianism had a profound influence on
social norms not only on China, but also in Japan, Korea, Vietnam and
other Asian countries.47 In terms of the sheer population involved,
Confucianism was far more influential than its contemporary
counterparts in western social and political thought.48 Under
Confucianism, the human rights of the individual are not an important
concept and foreign to the social order.49 Throughout thousands of
years of Chinese history, Confucianism taught that persons owed a
duty of obedience to superiors, that duty is fundamental to society and
government, and that rights are secondary and derivative of the prior
fulfilment of a duty.50 Citizens who fulfill a duty of loyalty to the state
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
46
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 108–09 (3d ed. 2017).
47 Id.
48 Id. Confucius was a contemporary of Aristotle and Plato. See DANIEL C.K.
CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL
40 (3d ed. 2015).
49
CHOW & LEE, supra note 46, at 45–46.
50 Id. at 46.
44
45
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are entitled to rights, but those who reject the fundamental duty to the
state are subject to justified punishment.51 These concepts are deeply
embedded in Chinese history and culture and resonate with China’s
public.52 Using these entrenched concepts, the Party portrays itself as
an authoritarian but benevolent patriarch.53 Appealing to Chinese
history, the CPC portrays its ascension to power as a matter of
destiny.54 During the chaos of the first half of the twentieth century,
when China was under constant threat by enemies from abroad and
from within, the CPC saw itself as the savior of the Chinese people
from the brink of annihilation.55 Only the CPC could save the Chinese
people and lead them to happy lives.56 Like the emperors of China who
preceded it, the CPC’s ascension to power over rivals is evidence that
the CPC holds the Mandate of Heaven—legitimate power—which can
only be forfeited if the emperor becomes corrupt and descends into
moral decay and tyranny.57 A close reading of the current PRC
Constitution illustrates how these concepts of tradition and history
favoring the CPC are embedded in that document.58
Second, the CPC also has effective legal arguments at its
disposal. The CPC argues that the Trump Administration is acting in
contravention of the law of the WTO in imposing trade sanctions
against China.59 Using this approach, China won a significant victory
on September 15, 2020, when the WTO rejected U.S. tariffs on over
$200 billion of Chinese imports,60 imposed during the Trump

51 See generally Na Jiang & Yifang Fu, Reasons for Harsh Punishments in China, 7
J. OF CIV. & LEGAL SCIS. 1 (2018); see also Justin Tiwald, Punishment and Autonomous
Shame in Confucian Thought, 435 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 5 (2017); Xue Yang, The
Confucianization of Law and the Lenient Punishments in China, 10 INT’L J. OF CRIM. JUST.
SCI. 32 (2015).
52
Grace Huang & Mary Grove, Confucianism and Chinese Families: Values and
Practices in Education, 2 INT’L J. HUMANS. SOC. SCI. 10, 10, 13 (2012).
53 See infra Part III.A.2.
54 See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] preamble (1982) (China).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57
CHOW & LEE, supra note 46, at 44.
58 See infra Part III.A.
59 See infra Part III.B.
60 See source cited infra note 232.
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Administration’s first wave of tariffs against China.61 A wellestablished jurisprudence in the WTO indicates that non-economic
considerations such as workers’ rights, a subset of human rights,
cannot be used as the basis for justifying trade sanctions.62 This is an
argument that finds support among the bulk of developing nation
members of the WTO, which now constitute a majority of its
membership.63 These legal arguments based on WTO law did not
impress the Trump Administration, showed a disdain for the WTO,
and flouted its laws.64 However, because other WTO nations, such as
the twenty-seven states of the European Union, do not share the
United States’ contempt for the WTO, these arguments bear weight.65
The United States has attempted to recruit other nations in
condemning China’s human rights record; while this effort has shown
some success in the United Nations,66 the legal barrier against the use
of trade sanctions for human rights violations could prevent other
nations from joining the United States in imposing trade sanctions
against China.67 This legal barrier will likely prevent the United States
from forming a broad coalition of nations that use trade sanctions to
punish China for human rights violations, but could leave the United
States as the sole practitioner of this tactic, undermining and limiting
its effectiveness.68
Third, the CPC argues that, because the United States’
condemnation of human rights in China is hypocritical, its arguments
thereby lack credibility.69 Mining the fertile ground of U.S. culture,
politics, and media, the CPC cleverly selects arguments first made by
U.S. parties that have gained traction in the United States.70 China then

See source cited infra note 230.
See sources cited infra notes 226, 227.
63 See sources cited infra notes 226, 227.
64 See Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World Trade
Organization, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9 (2019) (discussing how the United States may
refuse to follow any WTO decision with which it disagrees).
65 See infra Part III.B.
66 See infra Part III.B.
67 See infra Part III.B.
68 See infra Part III.B.
69 See infra Part III.C.
70 See infra Part III.C.
61
62
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turns these arguments against the United States.71 For example, China
argues that the United States is plagued by systemic racism in all of its
institutions because no less an authority than U.S. President Joe Biden
has acknowledged its existence.72 Using the same arguments that have
become popular in the United States, the CPC portrays the United
States in the Chinese media as engaging in human rights abuses that
are far more heinous and egregious than any in China.73 China claims
that the United States is the “world’s top human rights violator”74 and
is in no position to criticize China.75
Part II of this Article will briefly examine the three stages of
U.S. policy on human rights in China that span the last three decades
since the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Part III will examine
China’s strategy in defending its policies on human rights and its
counter message directed against the United States. Part IV concludes
that, in over three decades, U.S. policy on human rights in China has
failed to influence any significant positive changes in China’s human
rights policies due to China’s shrewd and effective defense of its
policies and the CPC’s promulgated counter-message to its citizenry.
Neither U.S. coercion nor cajolery has effected any meaningful
changes in China’s human rights policies. Despite this lack of progress,
the United States is likely to continue to criticize China’s human rights
policies. It is now unrealistic to believe that the United States’ efforts

See infra Part III.C.
In response to a question on whether systemic racism exists in U.S. law
enforcement, Biden, then a candidate for the U.S. Presidency, replied, “Absolutely,
. . . but it’s not just in law enforcement, it’s across the board. It’s in housing, it’s in
education, and it’s in everything we do. It’s real. It’s genuine. It’s serious.” Kathryn
Watson, Biden Says There’s “Absolutely” Systematic Racism in Law Enforcement and Beyond,
CBS NEWS (June 10, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/joe-biden-systemicracism-exists-law-enforcement/.
73 See infra Part III.C.
74 See infra Part III.C at note 249.
75 See Tim O’Connor, China Issues Human Rights Report Attacking U.S. Racism,
Gun Violence, Co-vid 19 Response, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.newsweek.com/china-human-rights-report-us-racism-violence-covid1578501 (China issued a report on human rights abuses in the United States, noting
that “[t]he U.S. government, instead of introspecting on its own terrible human rights
record, kept making irresponsible remarks on the human rights situation in other
countries, exposing its double standards and hypocrisy on human rights”).
71
72
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to effect change in China will bear any meaningful results. Instead, U.S.
criticism of China’s human rights policies can be used to justify tough
actions against China in other fields, such as trade. Otherwise, any U.S.
criticism of human rights policies in China will have a symbolic effect
only.
II. THREE STAGES OF U.S. POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
A. The Failed Policy of Conditionality
After a period of unrelenting turbulence and violent upheaval
due to intermittent wars and revolution during the first part of the
twentieth century,76 China entered a brief period of stability and
tranquility after Mao Zedong vanquished all of his enemies to establish
the People’s Republic of China in 1949.77 Facing extinction at various
points in its short existence, Mao’s Communist forces were able to
prevail against overwhelming odds to defeat a vastly numerically
superior enemy that enjoyed the support of the United States.78 While
the United States mourned the “loss” of China to communism,79 the
new nation withdrew from the global stage to focus its energies inward
on introspection and self-purification.
After the death of Mao in 1976, China emerged from the chaos
of the Cultural Revolution to direct its attention to its long neglected
economy and finally turned outward to re-engage in international
trade.80 By the late 1980s, a robust first wave of foreign trade with
China was underway when the People’s Liberation Army shocked the
world in June 1989 by firing upon and killing thousands of unarmed
citizens peacefully protesting in Tiananmen Square for democratic

CHOW & LEE, supra note 46, at 9–14.
Id. at 14-15.
78 Id. at 120–21.
79 Id. at 18.
80 Id. at 17–18, 33-35. The Cultural Revolution was a campaign of political
terror instigated by Mao and aimed at Mao’s rivals and enemies. See id. However, the
Cultural Revolutions spiraled out of control and harmed about 1 million victims. See
id. at 16–17.
76
77
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reform.81 Nations condemned the killings and labelled China a rogue
nation.82 In the United States, Congress began to respond to China’s
egregious violation of human rights.
1. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Most Favored Nation
Status
Since 1980, U.S. Presidents had granted trade benefits to China
in the form of Most Favored Treatment (MFN) tariffs under the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974.83 The JacksonVanik Amendment permits the President to grant MFN status to a
“non-market economy” provided that the country does not restrict
emigration.84
The
Jackson-Vanik
Amendment was targeted at the Soviet Union, which, at the time,
restricted or prohibited its citizens from emigrating.85 The United
States began to apply this legislation to China, as it was not restricted
to the Soviet Union, but drafted in general terms.86 The U.S. President
can decide to grant MFN status to China if the President finds that
China is in full compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment or the
President could waive full compliance, a tact that Presidents had
adopted since 1980.87 Until the Tiananmen Squire events in 1989,
granting annual MFN status to China was not controversial.88 After
1989, the annual renewal of China’s MFN status became hotly
contested in Congress until China acceded to the WTO in 2001 and
81
Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote Its View of
Human Rights, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 681, 681 n.1 (2013).
82 Id.
83 See KERRY DUMBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-603 F, CHINA’S MOSTFAVORED-NATION (MFN) STATUS: CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION, 1989–
1998, at 1 (1998). The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was enacted into law as part of
Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2056, signed into law
on Jan. 3, 1975, by President Gerald Ford. The amendment was designed to pressure
the Soviet Union to allow ease of emigration for Jews. See THOMAS J. PROBERT, THE
INNOVATION OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT, IN HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 323, 323 (Brendan Simms & D.J.B. Trim eds., 2011).
84
DUMBAUGH, supra note 83, at 1.
85 See VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., ORDER CODE 98-545,
THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT: A SURVEY, at i (2005).
86 See DUMBAUGH, supra note 83, at 1.
87 Id.
88 Id. at ii.
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obtained MFN status as a matter of right.89 Although the JacksonVanik Amendment focused on emigration policies, after the 1989
Tiananmen Square events, the United States began to link human
rights with the granting of MFN status.90
Obtaining MFN treatment from the United States was critical
to China’s nascent ascent as an exporting nation. With low labor costs
and an industrious workforce, China fueled the growth of their
economy by exporting goods to foreign nations in order to establish a
trade surplus.91 Access to the vast U.S. market was critical to China’s
success as a net exporting nation.92 During this period, China was still
emerging from grinding poverty and backwardness, far from the
economic powerhouse that it is today, and was in no position to make
demands on the United States.93
During this incipient phase of its development, China faced the
problem that the United States maintained a tariff system that
penalized countries, such as China, that were not members of the
WTO and did not acquire MFN status as a matter of right under WTO
law.94 The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS),
still currently in use, contains two columns of tariff rates. Under
Column 1 are “General” rates for WTO countries and countries with
which the United States has trade agreements.95 These rates are at
See GATT, supra note 7, art. I (requiring all WTO members to extend
MFN to all other WTO members).
90
DUMBAUGH, supra note 83, at 4.
91 See Jacob M. Schlesinger, How China Swallowed the WTO, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
1,
2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-swallowed-the-wto1509551308.
92 See Nicholas R. Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, BROOKINGS INST.
(May 9, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wtoaccession/; Nicholas R. Lardy, U.S.-China Economic Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 25, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/u-schina-economic-relations-implications-for-u-s-policy/.
93 See William Antholis, New Players on the World Stage: Chinese Provinces and
Indian
States,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Oct.
22,
2013),
http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2013/new-players-on-theworld-stage.html#; see also Lardy, supra note 93.
94
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 150 (4th ed. 2020).
95 Id. at 153–55.
89
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historic lows due to repeated rounds of negotiations, which led to
reductions through the WTO.96 Every member nation of the WTO is
entitled to the General rate under Column 1, sometimes referred to as
the MFN rate as required by Article I of the GATT/WTO.97 The MFN
term is somewhat misleading as it implies favorable or preferential
treatment, but the MFN term is in fact the rate applied to nearly all
U.S. trading partners. For this reason, the United States now uses the
term Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) instead of MFN to
designate the general tariff rate applied under Column 1.98 A nonWTO member country that does not have a trade agreement with the
United States receives the Column 2 rates.99 These rates were
established under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 during the
height of international trade protectionism when nations viewed each
other with mistrust and suspicion.100 Also referred to as the statutory
rate, the Column 2 rates are prohibitively high with rates that reach
60% in the HTSUS.101 Today, only certain pariah nations, such as Iran,
North Korea, or Cuba, would be subject to the statutory rate in
Column 2.102 In the 1990s, it was critical for China to receive MFN
96 See Tariffs: More Bindings and Closer to Zero, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm, (last visited
Sep. 20, 2021); Harmonized Tariff Schedule (2021 Preliminary Revision 2), U.S. INT’L
TRADE COMM’N, https://hts.usitc.gov/current (last visited Oct. 27. 20, 2021).
97
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 94, at 153.
98
Nicholas R. Lardy, Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China, BROOKINGS
INST. (May 10, 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/research/permanent-normaltrade-relations-for-china/ (“The cornerstone principle of the World Trade
Organization is that members provide each other unconditional Most Favored
Nation trade status, now called Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in U.S.
trade law.”).
99
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 94, at 153.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 153–54.
102
Iran, North Korea, and Cuba are subject to numerous additional U.S.
sanction regimes that impose independent restrictions that totally prevent or limit
trade aside from Column 2 tariffs. In the case of Iran, these regimes include the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 18 U.S.C. §
2332(d). Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010, Pub. L. 11-195, As Amended Through Pub. L. 112-239 (enacted January 2,
2013); Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. 11-44; Iran
Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-239. In the case of
North Korea, these sanctions regimes include the North Korean Sanctions and
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tariffs from the United States to gain access to the U.S. market to
become the exporting powerhouse that it is today.
After the events of Tiananmen Square, China’s granted MFN
status became a hotly debated and controversial topic in the U.S.
Congress.103 Although the debate first focused on denying MFN status
to China, the debate soon concerned whether to condition MFN status
on progress in human rights.104 Many in Congress argued that the
annual renewal process for MFN was the strongest leverage that the
United States had over China.105 Beginning in 1990, Congress used the
annual MFN renewal process to register its disapproval of China’s
repressive human rights policies and to put pressure on the
administration of George H. W. Bush to take action against Beijing.106
In 1991, Congress made several efforts to condition granting MFN
status to progress in protecting human rights.107 These efforts were
vetoed by Bush. Although both congressional bodies attempted to
override the veto, the vote failed by a narrow margin.108 In 1993,
President Clinton announced that he would explicitly link China’s
MFN status exclusively to human rights, a position that he reversed in
1994.109 Clinton argued that a policy of constructive engagement with
China would be more effective than using coercive tactics.110 Clinton’s
decision drew the support of pro-business interests, free traders, and
agricultural constituencies who all stood to benefit from the

Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-122, 130 Stat. 93; National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1655; International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651; and Section 5 of the United Nation
Participation Act of 1945, 22 US.C. § 287(c). In the case of Cuba, these other regimes
include the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22
U.S.C. §§ 7201–7211; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1966, 18
U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091; Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6010;
Sections 5 and 16 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 5, 16.
103 See DUMBAUGH, supra note 83, at 4.
104 Id. at iii.
105 Id. at 6.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 11–13.
108 Id. at 13.
109
DUMBAUGH, supra note 83, at 21–24.
110 Id. at 19–21.
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decision.111 Although Clinton delinked human rights from MFN, he
was mindful of Congress’ concerns; he sustained other sanctions
against China and continued to prioritize human rights in dealing with
China.112 Congress continued debating China’s MFN grant in spite of
its human rights concerns. However, the process soon became an
annual ritual in which Congress would bash and castigate China
followed by its ultimate grant of MFN to China.113
B. The Policy of Constructive Engagement
The second stage in U.S. policy towards human rights in China
began with China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, which also marked
the end of the use of annual reviews under the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. This stage is characterized by a policy of engagement
with China to encourage its progress in protecting human rights.
1. China and the WTO
In 1948, China became an original party to the GATT, the
predecessor to the WTO, but soon withdrew from the GATT as the
new nation focused its energies internally and turned away from the
global stage.114 In 1986, China submitted a new application for
accession to the WTO and negotiated with WTO members for over a
decade to reach an agreement on the conditions of its accession. 115
Although each applicant must negotiate with the entire membership
of the WTO, as a practical matter, the most important actor in this
process was the United States, which had taken the lead in negotiations

See id. at 25.
Id.
113 Id. at 32. (“As one House Ways and Means Committee member put it,
‘We all know we won’t revoke MFN. This is a debate amongst ourselves, with no
real value whatsoever.’”).
114
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Bilateral Agreement on China’s Entry
to the WTO Between China and the United States (Nov. 17, 2000); Karen Halverson,
China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B. C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 319, 325 (2004).
115
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, supra note 114; Halverson, supra
note 114, at 323 n.13.
111
112
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with China.116 Without the support of the United States, China did not
have a realistic chance of gaining admission to the WTO.117
Entry into the WTO was essential to China’s mercantilist goals
because tariffs under the WTO were “bound,” or subject to ceilings
established through rounds of negotiations over decades and were at
historic lows.118 Once China gained admission to the WTO, China
became entitled, under the MFN principle contained in GATT Article
I, to the lowest tariffs from every WTO member, including the United
States. As long as China remained outside of the WTO, nations could
impose tariffs in any amount that they wished on Chinese imports. 119
Gaining admission to the WTO and entitlement to MFN tariffs from
all WTO members was critical to China rising to become the world’s
leading exporting nation in the span of just three decades.120 Accession
to the WTO also allowed China to avoid the controversial annual
review under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as China was entitled to
MFN treatment from the United States under the WTO as a matter of
right.
2. President Bill Clinton and Human Rights
China’s accession to the WTO meant that the United States
was required under Article I of the GATT/WTO to extend MFN
treatment on a permanent basis to China. President Bill Clinton proved
to be a key ally for China in its quest for WTO accession and
permanent MFN. Clinton persuaded the U.S. Congress to vote in favor
of PNTR for China based on his argument that constructive
engagement with China would help promote human rights. In a key
Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, supra note 98; Zhiqun Zhu, To
Support or Not to Support: The American Debate on China’s WTO Membership, 6 J. CHINESE
POL. SCI. 77, 77 (2000).
117 See Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, supra note 98; Schlesinger, supra
note 91.
118
Absent the WTO, the importing nation is not subject to any legal
restraints on the amount of the tariff. The issue of tariffs applied to Chinese imports
is purely a bilateral issue between the importing nation and China.
119 See GATT, supra note 7, art. II:1(a)-(b) (tariff bindings) & art. I (MFN
principle).
120
Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade
Organization, 61 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 61, 77–78 (2014).
116

19

2021

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:1

speech given on March 9, 2000, at John Hopkins University, Clinton
outlined the benefits of engagement with China:
By joining the WTO, China is not simply agreeing to
import more of our products; it is agreeing to import
one of democracy’s most cherished values: economic
freedom. The more China liberalizes its economy, the
more fully it will liberate the potential of its people. . . .
And when individuals have the power, not just to
dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a
greater say.121
Clinton then explained the link between economic freedom
and political freedom:
There’s something even more revolutionary at work
here. By lowering the barriers that protect state-owned
industries, China is speeding a process that is removing
government from vast areas of people’s lives. . . .
[China] will have fewer instruments . . . with which to
control people’s lives. And that may lead to very
profound change. . . . [China] will find that the genie of
freedom will not go back into the bottle. As Justice
Earl Warren once said, liberty is the most contagious
force in the world. . . . I understand that this is not in
and of itself a human-rights policy. But still, it is likely
to have a profound impact on human rights and
political liberty.122
Clinton’s argument found a welcome reception in the U.S.
Congress. Clinton began his speech with a reminder that the “loss” of
China to communism after the Second World War led to bitter
recriminations in the United States.123 Clinton then dangled the
Full Text of President Bill Clinton, Speech on China Trade Bill, March 9,
2000,
https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_Chin
a_Trade_Bi.htm.
122 Id.
123 Id.
121
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prospect that engagement with China would lead to economic reform,
which would lead, in turn, to political freedom. He even suggested that
with reform, China could shed the shackles of communism and
embrace democracy. China’s acceptance of democracy was an
intoxicating possibility and was instrumental in Congress granting
PNTR to China, which China still enjoys today.
3. China in the Post-WTO Period
Immediately preceding and following China’s accession to the
WTO in 2001, China enacted reforms that strengthened the Party’s
control over key state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—business entities
owned and controlled by the state—rather than loosening its control,
as Clinton had predicted in his 2000 speech. In 1997, China adopted a
policy of selling off certain non-essential, state-owned industrial
enterprises to private operators.124 The policy, called “Zhua Da Fang
Xiao”—grasping the larger, letting go the smaller—was designed to
focus and tighten state control in strategic industrial sectors while
allowing private enterprise and control in non-strategic sectors.125
China maintained and tightened state control through SOEs in all vital
industrial sectors: banking, telecommunications, air and rail travel, steel
and metals, oil and gas exploration and production, and electricity and
water supply.126
In 2003, China established two central level authorities, the
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(“SASAC”)127 and the Central Huijin Investment Ltd. (CHI),128 to
Guidelines to the State-Owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government,
STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION & ADMIN. COMM’N OF THE STATE COUNCIL
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2011/12/06/c_313.htm; MIKAEL MATTLIN,
BRUSSELS INST. OF CONTEMP. CHINA STUDIES, CHINESE STRATEGIC STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES AND OWNERSHIP CONTROL 7–8 (2009); Mary E. Lovely &
Yang Liang, ‘State Enterprise Reform in China: Grasp or Release?’ W.E. Upjohn Institute,
at 85 (2018).
125 Id. at 8.
126
CHOW & LEE, supra note 46, at 24.
127
MATTLIN, supra note 124, at 7.
128 About Us, CENTRAL HUIJIN INVESTMENT LTD., http://www.huijininv.cn/huijineng/About_Us/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2021); Zoey Ye
Zhang, China’s SOE Reforms: What the Latest Round of Reforms Mean for the Market,
124
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increase its control over the state sector. Both the SASAC and CHI are
majority shareholders of their constituent SOEs and also actively
manage their assets.129 The SASAC owns and manages SOEs in the
industrial sectors and the CHI owns and manages all of China’s major
banks.130 Through the SASAC and CHI, the Party now controls the
vital sectors of China’s industrial and financial industries. In 2006,
China adopted a set of indigenous innovation policies131 to help
“national champions”—SOEs that can compete with the world’s
leading multinational companies.132 Among the most controversial
aspects of these of these policies was the requirement that PRC
government purchase products with locally produced intellectual
property instead of foreign sourced goods.133
In 2012, the elevation of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the
CPC, to China’s Presidency marked a sharp shift in China’s social
policies, resulting in greater Party control over all aspects of Chinese
citizens. Despite China’s economic success, Xi believed that the Party
had lost its legitimacy due to rampant corruption and moral decay and
that the nation was in need of rejuvenation.134 He was also determined
that the CPC would not suffer the ignominious fate of the Soviet
Communist Party that seemed to evaporate overnight under the

CHINA BRIEFING (May 29, 2019), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinassoe-reform-process/.
129 Guidelines to the State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 124; About Us, supra note
128.
130 See Guidelines to the State-Owned Enterprises Directly under the Central
Government supra note 124; ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI & COLE KYLE, U.S.-CHINA
ECONOMIC & SECURITY REVIEW COMM’, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE‐OWNED
ENTERPRISES
AND
STATE
CAPITALISM
IN
CHINA
73
(2011),
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOES
tudy.pdf
131
U.S. INT’LTRADE COMM’N, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR
MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, at 1-7 (2010).
132 Id. at 5-6.
133 Id. at 5-2 to 5-3.
134
XUEZHI GUO, THE POLITICS OF THE CORE LEADER IN CHINA:
CULTURE, INSTITUTION, LEGITIMACY, AND POWER 38–39, 46 (2019).
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pressure of economic and political reform.135 To restore the moral
legitimacy of the Party, Xi immediately instituted a crackdown against
corruption in the Party targeting both “tigers” and “flies” (high level
and low level Party cadres).136
Xi also reasserted party control over society by placing further
restrictions on civil society in the name of national security,
suppressing ethnic minorities and religious groups, and reducing the
freedom of PRC citizens.137 For example, in 2015 Xi launched a
crackdown of more than 250 human rights activists, detaining many of
them for years and convicting over a dozen of for “disturbing the
social order and subversion.”138 In 2017, China enacted a new
Cybersecurity Law that established broad government control over
online internet traffic in the name of social order and national
security,139 which has created one of the most restrictive internet
censorship systems in the world.140 The Cybersecurity Law also places
a burden on private internet providers to monitor content and to assist
China’s public security organs.141 Xi also further restricted the
permissible areas of free speech and silenced independent
journalists,142 including imprisoning a citizen-journalist who reported
critically on the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic in Wuhan.143

Chris Buckley, ‘Vows of Change in China Belie Private Warning,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/15/world/asia/vowingreform-chinas-leader-xi-jinping-airs-other-message-in-private.html.
136 Id. at 186.
137
THOMAS LUM & MICHAEL A. WEBER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45956,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA AND U.S. POLICY: ISSUES FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS, at
ii (Oct. 9, 2019).
138 Id. at 2.
139
Zhonghua renmin gongheduo wangluo anquan fa (中華人民共和國網
絡安全法) [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017).
140
LUM & WEBER, supra note 137, at 4.
141 Id. at 2.
142
Javier C. Hernández, ‘We’re Almost Extinct’: China’s Investigative Journalists
Are
Silenced
Under
Xi,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/asia/china-journalistscrackdown.html.
143 China Jails Citizen-Journalist for Four Years over Wuhan Virus Reporting,
REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus135
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Also in 2017, China passed a new National Intelligence Law that
creates a duty on citizens, organizations, and institutions to assist PRC
authorities in intelligence work targeting PRC individuals and
organizations.144
Xi launched several initiatives to deal with unrest in Xinjiang
Province, home to the Uighur ethnic minority, who objected to the
rule of the Han majority and engaged in violent protests in 2009. In
2016, China adopted a policy of “sinicization” that would assimilate
the Uighur minority—with their own language, culture, and religion—
to Chinese culture and language and force them to adopt China’s
socialist system and Party policies.145 Beginning in 2017, PRC
authorities have detained an estimated 1.5 million Uighurs (out of a
population of about 10.5 million) in what China calls “re-education
camps.”146 China also uses surveillance cameras, facial, voice, eye, and
gait recognition equipment to track the movement and activities of
Uighurs.147 PRC officials are also collecting massive amounts of data
as part of its efforts to use big data analytics to monitor the activity of
Uighurs and other groups.148
More recently, in an effort to deal with widespread protests for
democracy in Hong Kong, Xi imposed a new sweeping National
Security Law with draconian punishments designed to suppress
dissent.149 These recent measures, especially those in Xinjiang,
provoked a strong reaction from the Trump Administration as further
discussed below.

china-journalist/china-jails-citizen-journalist-for-four-years-over-wuhan-virusreporting-idUSKBN2920EI.
144
LUM & WEBER, supra note 137, at 3.
145 Id.
146 Id. at ii.
147 Id. at 4–5.
148 Id. at 5.
149
Examples of draconian punishments include sending Hong Kong
citizens to China for trial and imprisonment for protesting in Hong Kong. See
Jennifer Jett & Austin Ramzy,’From Protestor to Prisoner: How Hong Kong is Stifling
Dissent,’
N.Y.
Times
(May
28,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-court.html.
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C. The Trump Administration and Its Portrayal of China as the Arch
Villain of the Modern World
The third and current stage of U.S. policies toward human
rights in China began with the election of Donald J. Trump to the U.S.
Presidency in 2016. In 2017, in an acknowledgement that the policy of
engagement had failed, the Trump Administration announced that
supporting China’s accession to the WTO was a mistake because China
never fulfilled its commitments to dismantle the state sector.150 The
premise of the policy of engagement was that China’s new economic
freedoms would inevitably lead to political freedom. Yet, according to
the Trump Administration, China never fulfilled its WTO
commitments to implement economic freedoms in its state-controlled
economy.151
The Trump Administration’s criticism that China failed WTO
commitments was one aspect of a comprehensive new China policy.
One of the chief architects of the Trump Administration’s China
policy was Peter Navarro, a former business school professor and an
extreme China critic.152 Navarro viewed China as “brutal, amoral,
ruthless, [and] cheating”153 and China’s illegal trade practices as the
“central problem” of the modern world economy.154 He argued that
China is an “existential threat” to the United States.155 Other Trump
Administration officials viewed China in similarly stark terms. John
150
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 REPORT TO
CONGRESS
ON
CHINA’S
WTO
COMPLIANCE
at
2,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WTO
%20Report.pdf.
151 Id.
152 See Binyamin Applebaum, Trump Taps Peter Navarro, Vocal Critic of China,
for
New
Trade
Post,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/us/politics/peter-navarro-carl-icahntrump-china-trade.html.
153
Tom Phillips, ‘Brutal, Amoral, Ruthless, Cheating’: How Trump’s New Trade
Tsar
Sees
China,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
22,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/22/brutal-amoral-ruthlesscheating-trumps-trade-industrial-peter-navarro-views-on-china.
154 See Adam Davidson, Trump’s Muse on U.S. Trade with China, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 12, 2016), http://newyorker.com/business/currency/trumps-muse-on-u-strade-with-china.
155 See Mike Pompeo supra note 1.
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Ratcliffe, Trump’s Director of National Security, called China the
“greatest threat to America today, and the greatest threat to democracy
and freedom world-wide since World War II.”156
Although Trump officials have criticized China for human
rights abuses, this critique of China was part of the Trump
Administration’s broadside attack on China. The Trump
Administration did not have a discrete and well-considered policy on
human rights in China.157 Unlike previous approaches during the first
and second phase of U.S. policy towards human rights in China, the
Trump Administration had no policy on how to encourage positive
change in China’s human rights policies. Rather, the Trump
Administration seemed to take the position that a powerful but
malevolent China must be stopped in every arena and in every way
possible, including human rights abuses. Concerns about human rights
were used to bolster the Trump Administration’s overall portrayal of
China as the arch-villain of the modern world.
In a sharp break with previous U.S. administrations, the Trump
Administration made the widespread use of punitive tariffs against
China and other trading partners a cornerstone of its trade and
economic policy.158 The Trump Administration singled China out for
especially harsh treatment. In escalating fashion, the Trump
Administration imposed tariffs on $34 billion of selected Chinese
goods (April 16, 2018),159 $16 billion (June 20, 2018),160 $200 billion
156
John Ratcliffe, China Is National Security Threat No. 1, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national-security-threat-no-111607019599?mod=opinion_lead_pos5.
157 See David Dollar et al, Assessing U.S.-China relations 2 years into the Trump
presidency, BROOKINGS (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orderfrom-chaos/2019/01/15/assessing-u-s-china-relations-2-years-into-the-trumppresidency/.
158
Heather Long, ‘Trump has officially put more tariffs on U.S. allies than on China,’
WASH.
POST
(May
31,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/05/31/trump-hasofficially-put-more-tariffs-on-u-s-allies-than-on-china/.
159
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CHINA SECTION 301TARIFF ACTIONS AND EXCLUSION PROCESS (2020), https://ustr.gov/issueareas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/tariff-actions.
160 Id.
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(July 17, 2018),161 and $300 billion (August 1, 2019).162 In total, tariffs
were imposed on $550 billion of Chinese imports—virtually all
imports from China.163
The Trump Administration has taken specific actions against
China for its treatment of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang Province.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used especially strident terms in
describing China’s treatment of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. In 2019,
Pompeo called China’s treatment of the Uighurs the “stain of the
century.”164 In a parting shot against China as he was about to leave
office, Pompeo claimed that China is “committing genocide and
crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, China, targeting Uyghur Muslims
and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups.”165
On July 1, 2020, the Trump Administration issued the Xinjiang
Supply Chain Business Advisory, urging U.S. business with supply
Id.
Id.
163
Aimee Picchi, Trump Boosting U.S. Tariffs on $550 billion in Chinese Imports,
CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tariffs-china-trumpsays-he-is-boosting-tariffs-chinese-imports-in-retaliation-trade-war-2019-08-24/. In
retaliation, China imposed tariffs on $150 billion of U.S. imports. Subsequently, on
January 14, 2020, China signed Phase I of the Economic and Trade Agreement
between the United States and China that suspended or reduced tariffs on $300
billion of Chinese imports, leaving tariffs on $250 billion with further reductions
linked to signing Phase II of the Agreement. See Economic and Trade Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
The People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., Jan. 15, 2020, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement
/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_T
ext.pdf. For a detailed analysis of the Economic and Trade Agreement see Daniel
C.K. Chow, A New and Controversial Dispute Resolution Approach under the U.S.-China
Trade Agreement of 2020, HARV. NEG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
164
David Brunnstrom & Lesley Wroughton, Pompeo Calls China’s Treatment of
Uighurs
‘Stain
of
the
Century’,
REUTERS
(July
18,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-religion-china/pompeo-calls-chinastreatment-of-uighurs-stain-of-the-century-idUSKCN1UD20P.
165
Bill Chappell, Pompeo Accuses China of Genocide Against Muslim Uighurs in
Xinjiang,
NPR
(Jan.
19,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/19/958468971/pompeo-accuses-china-ofgenocide-against-muslim-uighurs-in-xinjiang.
161
162

27

2021

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:1

chains linked to Xinjiang to consider the risks involved with doing
business with Xinjiang entities that engage in human rights abuses,
such as forced labor.166 On July 11, 2020, the United States imposed
export trade restrictions on eleven Chinese companies implicated in
human rights abuses in Xinjiang.167 The restrictions limit the ability of
these entities to access U.S. products and technology exports.168 This
action added thirty-seven Chinese entities to trade blacklists in
October 2019 and June 2020, which were already on trade blacklists
for their involvement in human rights violations in Xinjiang.169
Beginning on May 1, 2020, the United States issued a series of orders
that blocked all imports from designated Chinese companies.170 Three
of the companies on this blacklist were specifically found to have used
forced labor.171 On September 14, 2020, the Trump Administration
blocked imports of computer parts, hair products, cotton, and linen
products from companies in Xinjiang that were the fruits of forced
labor.172 These orders were added to a dozen previous orders on
various products from Xinjiang to combat forced labor.173 On January
13, 2021, the United States banned all cotton and tomato imports from

Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2021),
https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/.
167
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, Commerce Department Adds Eleven
Chinese Entities Implicated in Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang to the Entity List
(July
20,
2020),
https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/news/pressreleases/2020/07/commerce-department-adds-eleven-chinese-entities-implicatedhuman. The restrictions limit the ability of these entities to access exports of U.S.
products and technology. Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, Withhold Release Orders and
Findings,
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/forcedlabor/withhold-release-orders-and-findings (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
171
Kevin Cirilli, U.S. Government Bars Some China Xinjiang Firms on Alleged
Abuse; Plans More, BUSINESS STANDARD (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.businessstandard.com/article/international/us-govt-bars-some-china-xinjiang-firms-onalleged-abuse-plans-more-120090900066_1.html.
172
Doug Palmer & Gavin Bade, U.S. Blocks Certain Chinese Imports over Forced
Labor, POLITICO (Sept. 14, 2020) https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/14/usblocks-chinese-products-forced-labor-414578.
173 Id.
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Xinjiang, stating that they were the products of forced labor.174 This
ban supersedes many of the previous bans that targeted clothing and
textiles produced from cotton grown in Xinjiang.
The United States also used the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act175 to place two PRC officials on a blacklist,
freezing their U.S. assets and denying them entry visas to the United
States.176 These actions led China to retaliate by denying visas to several
U.S. officials.177 These actions by both countries are largely symbolic
because the actions had no practical consequences. The Chinese and
U.S. officials involved were not likely to travel and did not have a need
for the visas.
It is too early to determine whether the Biden Administration
will reverse or soften these policies. However, President Biden has
announced that he intends to maintain all existing tariffs on China and
has vowed to continue to take a tough approach to China.178
III. CHINA’S DEFENSE OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES
China’s defense of its human rights policies is primarily
directed at its own citizenry, without whose support and confidence
Eva Xiao, U.S. Bans Cotton, Tomato Imports from China’s Xinjiang Region,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-bans-cotton-tomatoimports-from-chinas-xinjiang-region-11610572070.
175
Global Magnitsky Act, Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328, 22 U.S.C. §
2656 note (authorizing the President to impose economic sanctions and deny entry
into the United States to any foreign person identified as engaging in human rights
abuse or corruption).
176
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, Global Magnitsky Designations; Issuance of
Global Magnitsky General License; Issuance of Global Magnitsky Frequently Asked Question
(July
31,
2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/recent-actions/20200731.
177 China Says Will Take Countermeasures in Response to U.S. Visa Bans, REUTERS
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-rights/china-sayswill-take-countermeasures-in-response-to-u-s-visa-bans-idUSKBN28W0PB; China
Imposes New Visa Limits in Back-and-Forth with US, AP NEWS (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-race-and-ethnicity-tibet-legislationchina-159016e93a430ef1739a7f71d1ab06d7.
178 See Biden Says Will Not Kill Phase 1 Trade Deal With China Immediately, supra
note 36.
174

29

2021

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:1

the CPC would lose its seat of power. China’s approach depends on
three prongs: Chinese tradition and culture, legal arguments based on
WTO law, and a counterattack on the human rights abuses in the
United States.
A. Chinese Tradition and History
1. Revival of Confucianism
Xi Jinping made a deliberate choice to revive Confucianism
and to explicitly link the CPC with traditional Chinese culture. 179
Confucianism was denigrated under Mao Zedong as one of the “four
olds” of corrupt feudal China that had to be rejected.180 Under Xi,
Chinese tradition is the “soul” of the nation.181 He stated that “the
Chinese Communist Party is the successor to and promoter of fine
traditional Chinese culture.”182 He also stated that the “values and
spiritual world of the Chinese people have always been deeply rooted
in the fertile soil of China’s traditional culture.”183 This revival of
Chinese tradition is part of what Xi proclaims is the “China Dream,”
a great spiritual rejuvenation with a return to national glory and
ambitious economic and territorial goals.184
Appealing to Confucianism and Chinese tradition, the CPC
portrayed itself as an authoritarian but benevolent patriarch at the top
of a strict hierarchy that will protect and guide the Chinese people to a

179
Jin Kai, The Chinese Communist Party’s Confucian Revival, THE DIPLOMAT
(Sept. 30, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-chinese-communistpartys-confucian-revival/.
180
Christopher Klein, What Was the Cultural Revolution?, HISTORY (Aug. 9,
2019), https://www.history.com/news/what-was-the-cultural-revolution.
181 On the Road: Traditional Culture Is the Soul of a Nation, CHINA GLOBAL
TELEVISION NETWORK (Oct. 20, 2019), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-1020/On-the-Road-Traditional-culture-is-the-soul-of-a-nationKWGu8IdnZ6/index.html.
182
Kai, supra note 179.
183 Id.
184
Graham Allison, What Xi Jinping Wants, THE ATLANTIC (May 31, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/what-chinawants/528561/.
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better future in exchange for their loyalty and obedience.185 The CPC
views itself as the historically destined leader of China.186 When a
prostrate China was under attack from enemies within and without,
only the CPC, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, could rise up to
save the Chinese people and lead them to freedom and better lives.187
While benevolent, the patriarch can also mete out punishment when
disobedience threatens the social order.188 These concepts, familiar to
most Chinese citizens who are deeply embedded in traditional Chinese
culture, apply at all levels of society.189
Under Confucianism, the concept of human rights was
unimportant and foreign to the social order.190 The basic unit of society
under Confucianism was the collective, not the individual. 191 At the
most elemental level of society, the family was the most important
unit.192 Within this unit, all relationships were vertical in nature and that
of a superior to an inferior. Husband-wife, father-son, older brother
and younger brother were all relationships of a superior to an inferior.
Only in the relationship of friend to friend was there equality in the
relationship, but as this relationship was outside of the family, it was
not considered fundamental.193
This same hierarchical dynamic applied with even greater force
to the nation, “guo jia” in Chinese or “nation family.” At the top of
this hierarchy was the emperor who assumed the role of the patriarch
or the father of the nation.194 Although the emperor was the highest
185
Chi Wang, Xi’s Strong Leadership Style has its Advantages, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/2136235/xi-jinpings-strong-leadership-style-has-its-risks-also
(noting that “Xi hopes to paint himself as a benevolent, paternal leader of China”).
186
XIANFA, preamble (1982) (China).
187 Id.
188 See CHOW & LEE, supra note 46, at 47 (discussing punishments under
Confucian China).
189 See supra notes 50–52.
190 See CHOW & LEE, supra note 46, at 45–46.
191 See Betty H. Winfield et al., Confucianism, Collectivism and Constitutions: Press
Systems in China and Japan, 5 COMMUNICATION LAW AND POLICY 323, 330 (2010).
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See CHOW & LEE, supra note 46, at 43.
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being in the social order, his power was not absolute.195 In exchange
for his citizens’ loyalty and obedience, the emperor had a reciprocal
duty to protect and bestow beneficence on his people.196 If the
emperor became corrupt and descended into moral decay and
despotism, he would forfeit the Mandate of Heaven—legitimate
power—and be deposed by a challenger who would then assume the
throne under a new Mandate of Heaven.197 Under Confucianism
thought, the inferior’s duties of loyalty and obedience were deemed
fundamental.198 Only if this duty was fulfilled would the reciprocal duty
of the superior be triggered.199 The superior’s duty was secondary or
derivative to the inferior being’s prior duty of fealty and obedience.
These Confucian concepts are embedded in the PRC
Constitution, which contains many references to duties of citizens.200
This is unusual among modern constitutions, such as the U.S.
Constitution, which focus on setting forth rights of citizens. For
example, Chapter II of the PRC Constitution is entitled “The
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens.” Article 33 states: “Every
citizen is entitled to the rights and at the same time must perform the
duties prescribed by the Constitution and other laws.”201 Consistent
with Confucianism, rights are linked with duties, with the duties
fundamental and the rights secondary.
The PRC Constitution also contains several explicit
pronouncements of the duties of its citizens. Citizens must “safeguard
the unification of the country and unity of all of its nationalities” (Art.
52);202 “keep State secrets, protect public property, observe labour
discipline and public order and respect social ethics” (Art. 53); 203
“safeguard the security, honour and interests of the motherland” (Art.

Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 44.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 46.
199 Id.
200 See Weng Li, Philosophical Influences on Contemporary Chinese Law, 6 IND.
INT’L & COMP. LAW REV. 327, 330 (1996).
201
XIANFA, art. 33 (1982) (China).
202 Id. art. 52.
203 Id. art. 53.
195
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54);204 and “defend the motherland and resist aggression” (Art. 55).205
At several points, the PRC Constitution also makes explicit that the
interests of the State are superior to the interests of individual citizens:
Article 51 states that “[c]itizens of the People’s Republic of China, in
exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the
interests of the State.”206 Other provisions in the PRC Constitution
explicitly limit the exercise of citizens’ rights if they conflict with state
interests. For example, Article 36 states that citizens “enjoy freedom
of religious belief,”207 but then adds that “[n]o one may make use of
religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the
health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the
State.”208
2. Patriarch and Teacher
Like Confucius, Xi also sees himself as a teacher.209 The name
Confucius or “Kong zi” contains the honorific “zi” which refers to a
teacher or master. Consistent with the view that the patriarch should
also teach his citizens, Xi has created the mobile application “Xuexi
Qiangguo” or “Study the Great Nation.”210 With over 100 million
users, “Xuexi Qiangguo” is one of the most popular apps in China and
people all over China are expected to conscientiously study the app,
which contains lectures and quizzes.211 The app aims to teach Chinese
citizens stories about Xi’s own past and the history of the CPC and
instill in them a strong sense of pride and nationalism.212 The app
Id. art 54.
Id. art 55.
206 Id. art 51.
207 Id. art. 36.
208 Id.
209 China Schools: Xi Jinping Thought Introduced Into Curriculum, BBC (August 25,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58301575.
210
Jane Li, An App to Teach Xi Jinping Thought Can Study the Phones of Its 100
Million Users, QUARTZ (Oct. 14, 2019), https://qz.com/1727362/chinese-apppromoting-xi-jinping-thought-has-access-to-100-million-users-phones/.
211 Id.
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-broadens-data-collection-throughpropaganda-app-and-translation-service-11571058689.
204
205

33

2021

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:1

contains lectures and quizzes.213 Party cadres are also expected to study
the app regularly, and their use of the app is monitored and reported
to Party leaders.214
Xi has also instituted a Social Credit System, a combination of
big data analytics and data collection.215 The concept of social credit is
linked to the key tenet of “moral credit” that was central to
Confucianism. Citizens in a Confucian society were expected to aspire
to be morally trustworthy and honest.216 Under the Social Credit
System, citizens and companies are ranked in accordance with their
conduct and decisions.217 Persons with poor social credit could be
penalized by having limited access to education, housing, bank loans,
and other benefits.218 Many critics may view this system as an intrusive
and Orwellian system of monitoring and supervision, but it can also be
portrayed in a positive way to Chinese citizens. In accordance with
Confucianism, the Social Credit System is a teaching tool, used by a
benevolent and caring patriarch to guide citizens on the path of a
morally honest and worthy life and to punish and correct those who
lead a dissolute and unworthy one.219 To inculcate this message at an
early age with China’s youth, Xi instituted mandatory programs to
study Xi Jinping thought in China’s high schools and elementary
schools.220

Id.
Id.
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A long-term survey conducted by Harvard University found
that nearly all citizens in China trust the central government in
Beijing.221 In 2016, the last year of the study, the survey found that
95.5% were “relatively satisfied” or “highly satisfied” with the PRC
central government.222 (By contrast, a Gallup Poll in 2020 found that
only 38% of U.S. citizens were satisfied with the size and power of the
federal government.)223 The Harvard study is viewed as particularly
trustworthy since it was conducted by an institution outside of
China.224 Two other studies by institutions outside of China show
similar results. A survey by Statistica, a global business data platform,
showed that in 2020, 82% of Chinese citizens trusted their
government, placing China first among twenty-six countries polled.225
The 82% is a precipitous drop from about 90% in 2019 and is likely
related to the coronavirus pandemic outbreak.226 A study by York
University in Canada similarly showed that over 90% of Chinese
citizens trust the central government in handling the pandemic.227 Most
other surveys find similar levels of trust and support for the central

loyal-generation-but-in-hong-kong-not-so-fast/2019/11/28/80f4d586-0c2c-11ea8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html; Te-Ping Chen, Reading, Writing and Xi Jinping Thought:
China’s Students Learn Leader’s Philosophy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2018),
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government among China’s citizens.228 In recent years, as the Trump
Administration launched numerous broadside attacks on China,
Chinese citizens’ support for their government rose.229
Although critics may find the Party’s use of Confucianism to
be contrived and disingenuous, the Harvard study and other studies
indicate that the CPC’s strategy seems to have been highly successful
with the one constituency that matters the most—China’s own
citizens.
B. Legal Arguments under the WTO
The second prong of China’s defense of its human rights
policies is based on legal arguments drawn from WTO law. As detailed
earlier, the Trump Administration enacted a number of trade bans on
imports from the Xinjiang Province, including a total trade ban on all
cotton and tomato products.230 Although the Trump Administration
criticized human rights abuses generally in Xinjiang, the administration
specifically cited the products’ forced labor as its rationale supporting
the import ban. 231 However, China has many valid arguments based
on WTO law and precedent that these trade sanctions based on forced
labor are illegal.
U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports are “bound” under WTO law,
which establishes a ceiling above which no U.S. tariffs can be imposed.
The obligation is made explicit under GATT Article II:1(b) and
considered one of the fundamental obligations of the GATT.232 The

Feng, supra note 227 (“[O]ther larger-scale polls conducted in China have
found high levels of satisfaction with the national-level government
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United States can change the official tariff rates on goods from China
only under carefully circumscribed conditions set forth in GATT
Article XXVIII.233 The GATT/WTO also allows members to impose
temporary higher tariffs due to exceptions explicitly recognized by
GATT articles. For example, a WTO member can impose higher
tariffs on imports or impose a complete trade ban when “necessary to
protect human . . . life or health.”234 Although tariffs higher than the
rate under the target nation’s GATT schedule would normally violate
GATT Article II:1(b), and a trade ban would violate GATT Article
XI235 prohibiting import quotas, the trade sanction is permitted under
the exceptions provision of GATT Article XX(b)—the general
exceptions provision.
Whether or not workers’ rights and human rights can justify
trade sanctions in the GATT/WTO has long been controversial. 236
After the WTO was established in 1995, the first WTO Ministerial
Conference, the WTO’s highest authority, in Singapore in December
1996 adopted the following five-point declaration:
•
We renew our commitment to the observance
of internationally recognized core labor standards.

that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs in excess of those set forth and provided
therein.”)
GATT, supra note 7, Art. 2(1) (emphasis added). The emphasized language means
that the United States cannot exceed the tariff rate in its tariff schedule without
violating Article 2(1)(b).
233
The modification of tariff schedules can be done only by negotiating with
the affected party or parties. See id. art. XXVIII.
234 See id. art. XX(b). Article XX is the general exceptions article.
235 See id. art. XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions).
236
Labor rights are a subset of human rights, which are also not within the
scope of the WTO. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 395–98 (3d ed. 2017); Susan Ariel Aaronson & Jean
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37

2021

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:1

•
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is
the competent body to set and deal with these
standards, and we affirm our support for its work in
promoting them.
•
We believe that economic growth and
development fostered by increased trade and further
trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of
these standards.
•
We reject the use of labour standards for
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative
advantage of countries, particularly low-wage
developing countries, must in no way be put into
question.
•
In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO
Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.237
The WTO elaborated on the position of developing countries
on workers’ rights as follows:
The WTO’s developing-country members resist
including labour standards in WTO rules because: (a)
they see it as a guise for protectionism in developedcountry markets, a smokescreen for undermining the
comparative advantage of lower-wage developing
countries; and (b) they argue that better working
conditions and improved labour rights arise through
economic growth—sanctions imposed against
countries with lower labour standards would merely
perpetuate poverty and delay improvements in
workplace standards.238

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December
1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, December 18, 1996, ¶4.
238 Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization? Criticism, Yes . . .
Misinformation,
No!,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
237
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The most important consequence of the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration is that workers’ rights cannot be used to justify an import
or other trade restriction on goods from China. Workers’ rights must
be asserted in the ILO, which the Singapore Ministerial Declaration
has designated as the proper forum with jurisdiction over this issue,
not the WTO where the issue of workers’ rights is not cognizable.
Moreover, this position has strong political support from developing
WTO member countries, which now comprise about a two-thirds
majority of WTO members.239 Thus, the United States’ rationale
underlying its cotton and tomato trade ban, as a product of coerced
labor, is a legally unjustifiable argument in the WTO. As a result, this
U.S. trade ban, and all other current U.S. trade bans, based on coerced
labor are illegal under GATT Article XI prohibiting quotas240 and
Article I, which requires MFN treatment for China.241
China proved to be an adept and effective litigant in WTO
cases, winning a case contesting tariffs under the Trump
Administration’s first wave of tariffs, imposed in 2018.242 In United
States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China,243 the WTO panel
ruled that the Trump Administration’s first wave of tariffs on over
$200 billion of goods from China were illegal under the GATT.244 The
panel found that the tariffs violated GATT Article II because the tariffs
were in excess of the bound rates to which the United States had
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/misinf_e/03l
ab_e.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
239
About two thirds of the WTO members are developing countries. See
WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 93
(5th
ed.
2011),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap6_e.pdf.
240 See GATT, supra note 7, art. XI. A total trade ban violates Article XI
because the ban is a quota of zero.
241 See id. art. I. Imposing a trade ban on China violates MFN because it
singles out China for discriminatory treatment. Under MFN, China is entitled to the
same treatment that the United States gives to other WTO members, i.e., to be free
of the tariffs.
242 See Decision of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Methodologies and Their
Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China, WTO Doc. WT/DS471/ARB
(Nov. 1, 2019).
243
Panel Report, United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China,
WTO Doc. WT/DS543/R (adopted Sept. 15, 2020).
244 Id. at ¶ 8.1.c.
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agreed to apply to imports from China and that the United States
lacked justification for the excess rates.245 The United States attempted
to justify the tariffs as retaliatory for China’s lack of respect for U.S.
intellectual property rights.246 The WTO rejected this argument
because nothing in the WTO authorizes the imposition of tariffs for
perceived violations of intellectual property rights.247 Undoubtedly,
China will soon appeal the Xinjiang import tariffs on products of
forced labor and will likely win that case against the United States
because it can make the same argument: nothing in the WTO
recognizes labor rights as a justification for imposing tariffs.
The illegality of its actions under the GATT/WTO will likely
be of little consequence to the United States as it has openly scorned
the WTO under the Trump Administration.248 However, China’s
argument that trade restrictions based on workers’ rights are illegal can
become a significant impediment to the U.S. recruitment of other
countries to join in the ban.
The United States has recently attempted to garner
international support for its condemnation of human rights abuses in
Xinjiang. On October 6, 2020, at the United Nations headquarters,
thirty-nine countries signed the U.S. Mission Joint Statement on the
Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang and Developments in Hong

Id. at ¶ 7.96.
Id. at ¶ 7.100.
247 Id. at ¶ 7.179. The United States filed an appeal from the panel decision.
The WTO Appellate Body cannot convene because its members fell below the
number necessary to convene because the United States blocked the re-appointment
of existing members and the appointment of new members. See Daniel C.K. Chow,
United States Trade Infallibility and the Crisis of the World Trade Organization, 2020 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 599, 600–01. The Obama Administration initiated the action to block,
which was continued by the Trump Administration. Id. The actions by the United
States have paralyzed the Appellate Body as it is unable to convene and decide cases.
Id. This means that the appeal filed by the United States has suspended the panel
decision in a legal limbo, making it unenforceable. Id. The United States will be able
to continue imposing the challenged tariffs so long as the panel decision remains
suspended indefinitely. This act by the United States, however, did not shield it from
criticism from the EU, which sided with China in the dispute. See infra text
accompanying note 238.
248 See Chow, supra note 64, at 8–11.
245
246
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Kong.249 For the U.S. trade restrictions on products from Xinjiang to
be truly effective, the United States needs to recruit other nations to
adopt similar measures. A U.S.-led trade ban on goods from Xinjiang
could create significant economic and political pressure on China if the
ban is joined by a coalition of powerful trading nations, such as
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
France, all signatories to the Statement by the U.S. Mission. 250 For
these other countries, however, the illegality of the trade ban under
WTO law may become a significant impediment as these other
countries are WTO members who did not share the United States’
disdain for the WTO. In United States – Tariffs Measures on Certain Goods
from China, both Australia and the European Union, traditional U.S.
allies, submitted briefs in favor of China and against the U.S. tariffs.
The EU criticized the United States for acting unilaterally in imposing
tariffs on China “whenever it considers that another Member is acting
‘unfairly[.]’ . . . Such unilateral responses to perceived unfair acts of
another Member are themselves both unfair and illicit under the WTO
agreement.”251 These sentiments expressed by the EU indicate that
China’s legal arguments under the WTO may shield it from the
expansion of the U.S. trade ban on goods from Xinjiang.
C. China’s Counterattack on the United States
China bases the third prong of its human rights policy defense
upon the political and moral argument that the United States is being
hypocritical in attacking China because U.S. human rights abuses are
far more egregious than any abuses in China.

Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang and the
Recent Developments in Hong Kong, Delivered by Germany on Behalf of 39
Countries,
U.S.
MISSION
TO
THE
U.N.
(Oct.
6,
2020),
https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-human-rights-situation-inxinjiang-and-the-recent-developments-in-hong-kong-delivered-by-germany-onbehalf-of-39-countries/.
250
Sarah Anne Aarup, Ban on Uyghur imports becoms EU’s hot potato, POLITICO
(Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/uyghur-china-europe-ban-importseurope-trade-hot-potato-forced-labor/.
251
Tim Fernholz, China Is Winning the Trade War, QUARTZ (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://qz.com/1903856/the-wto-rules-trumps-china-tariffs-are-illegal/.
249
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China has bolstered its arguments about human rights abuses
in the United States by using the same reasoning first presented by U.S.
politicians and political groups. China is a careful observer of U.S.
politics and culture and has mined these fertile grounds for arguments
that have gained traction in the United States. For example, on June 6,
2020, an editorial appearing in the China Daily, the voice of the CPC,
stated:
The U.S. administration has been quick to holler about what it
claims are human rights abuses in other countries, but the angry chants
that could be heard all weekend across the U.S. protesting at the killing
of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on
Monday last week, the latest in a long line of African-Americans killed
by white police officers, show that it should be looking closer to
home.252
Xinhuanet, a web-based news service controlled by the CPC,
also criticized the United States for “systematic racial
discrimination.”253 For proof of systemic racism in the United States,
China has to look no further than the words of President Joe Biden.
While campaigning for president, Biden stated the following in
response to the question of whether systemic racism existed in law
enforcement: “Absolutely, but it’s not just in law enforcement, it’s
across the board. It’s in housing, it’s in education, and it’s in everything
we do. It’s real. It’s genuine. It’s serious.”254 A systemic problem is
pervasive, reaching all institutions and organizations of a nation; for all
of its criticism of China, the United States has never argued that human
rights abuses are systemic in China.

252 Racism Stains US Claim to Greatness, CHINA DAILY (June 1, 2020),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202006/01/WS5ed4f651a310a8b24115a01a.ht
ml.
253 Update: China, on Behalf of 26 Countries, Criticizes U.S., Other Western Countries
for
Violating
Human
Rights,
XINHUA
(Oct.
6,
2020),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-10/06/c_139420998.htm.
254
Watson, supra note 72.
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China also promoted the 1619 Project,255 sponsored by the
New York Times, which controversially declared that America fought
the Revolutionary War with Britain in large part to preserve slavery.256
The Chinese state media is now repeating the 1619 Project’s claim that
1619, the year that the slaves first arrived, “should actually be seen as
the year of America’s birth.”257 Secretary of State Pompeo has
denounced the 1619 Project as a gift to the CPC.258 Pompeo stated,
“The Chinese Communist Party must be gleeful when they see the
New York Times spout this ideology.”259
The Chinese media further elaborated on the long history of
discrimination from the earliest days of the United States260 to the
present, when ugly incidents of discrimination against AsianAmericans erupted in response to the belief that the COVID-19

255
Stephen Ngedwa, Barr & Trump Try to Rewrite Slave History But Fail in
Reality, CGTN (Sept. 19, 2020), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-09-19/BarrTrump-try-to-rewrite-slavery-but-fall-flat-in-reality-TUnzFABE8U/index.html.
256
Leslie M. Harris, I Helped Fact Check the 1619 Project. The Times Ignored Me,
POLITICO
(Mar.
6.
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/06/1619-project-new-yorktimes-mistake-122248.
257 Id.
258
Joel Gehkre, Pompeo Denounces Marxist 1619 Project as Gift to Chinese
Communist
Party,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(July
16,
2020),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/pompeodenounces-marxist-1619-project-as-gift-to-chinese-communist-party.
259 Id.
260 E.g., Institute for Central Asia Studies, Between Inside and Outside, the Double
Standard of the US on Counter-Secessionism, GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1206295.shtml.
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pandemic originated in China.261 Based on these points, China claimed
that the United States is “the world’s top human rights violator.”262
The PRC media also frequently broadcasts video of the violent
protests in the United States that erupted after the death of George
Floyd on May 25, 2020.263 The PRC media also broadcasted a video of
Trump supporters who invaded and occupied the U.S. capitol building
on January 6, 2021.264 The PRC media use these images to depict the
United States as a violent and dangerous nation that is out of control
and being torn apart by racial hatred and internal conflict. One message
that the Party appears to convey is that without strong internal security
controls, violent protests can erupt, destroying property and
endangering public safety,265 which is assuaged by the Party’s second
message reassuring the citizens of China that the Party’s use of strict
controls would never allow such anarchy to occur in China.266

261 E.g., Sun Haoran, So Much Discrimination Toward Asian Americans, So Little
Media Attention: Satirist Joe Wong, GLOBAL TIMES (June 5, 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1190684.shtml; see also Andrew Hay & Maria
Caspani, Fake Flyers and Face-Mask Fear: California Fights Coronavirus Discrimination,
REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-usadiscrimination/fake-flyers-and-face-mask-fear-california-fights-coronavirusdiscrimination-idUSKBN208063.
262
Riyaz ul Khaliq, US World’s Top Human Rights Violator Says China,
ANADOLU AGENCY (July 16, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/-usworld-s-top-human-rights-violator-china-says/1912539.
263
Ron Ruwitch, In George Floyd Protests, China Sees a Powerful Propaganda
Opportunity, NPR (June 3, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868566978/ingeorge-floyd-protests-china-sees-a-powerful-propaganda-opportunity;
Huizhong
Wu, In China, U.S. Protests a Hot Topic on State, Social Media, REUTERS (June 1, 2020)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-media/in-china-u-s-protests-a-hottopic-on-state-social-media-idUSKBN23824K; see also infra note 254.
264 See Why Did US Politicians and Media Support Turmoil in HK but Condemn
Rioters Now? Chinese FM Asks, GLOBAL TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1212113.shtml; China Compares U.S. Mob
Attack on Capitol to Hong Kong Protests, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-07/communist-party-papercasts-u-s-capital-chaos-as-karma.
265
This observation is based upon the author’s own professional opinion in
interpreting the message by the PRC media.
266 Id.
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The PRC state media also frequently compares the violent
protests in the United States to the democracy protesters in Hong
Kong.267 The message that the Party appears to convey is that the
United States is again being hypocritical in criticizing China for
suppressing the protests in Hong Kong while U.S. police and military
are also used in suppressing some of the violent protests in the United
States.
The Party uses the media constantly to promulgate and
reinforce these messages critical of the U.S. record on human rights.
The PRC media claims that based on its own history of egregious
abuses, the United States lacks credibility and is no position to criticize
China’s human rights record.268
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of U.S. policy on human rights in China is replete
with missed opportunities and miscalculations. During the first phase
(1989–1990), the United States had its greatest leverage over China.
During this phase, the United States controlled two benefits that China
desperately wanted: MFN (or PNTR) status and accession to the
WTO. The United States might have been able to condition MFN
status or WTO accession on meaningful structural reforms in China,
but these opportunities were missed.
Secretary of State Pompeo was entirely correct when he stated
that the Party places the opinion of its citizens above all of the
condemnation and criticism of foreign nations.269 Like all emperors of
China before it, the Party knows that it will continue to hold the
Mandate of Heaven so long as it has the trust and support of the
267
Zhang Zhouxiang, US Politicians Should Stop Dreaming and Face Reality,
CHINA
DAILY
(May
31,
2020),
https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202005/31/WS5ed30e8da310a8b241159ab1.ht
ml; Hu Xijin, Watch Out! ‘Beautiful Sight’ in HK Is Spreading Across the US, GLOBAL
TIMES (May 30, 2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1190031.shtml.
268 See Chen Qingqing & Cao Siqi, China issues annual US human rights report
amid escalating Washington-led West’s attacks on Beijing, GLOBAL TIMES (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219366.shtml.
269 See Mike Pompeo supra note 1.
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citizens of China. For this reason, the Party invested extensive
resources in creating the image of itself as an authoritarian but
benevolent patriarch, a message that seems to resonate with China’s
citizens who exhibit a high level of trust in the Party. Moreover, the
Party has been able to portray itself as being on higher moral ground
than the United States. By cleverly using the same arguments first
raised by U.S. parties, the Party has been able to paint a picture of the
United States as a hypocritical abuser of human rights on a
fundamental and systemic level whose criticism of China lacks
credibility. As the Trump Administration increased its attacks on China
in recent years, Chinese citizens’ support of the Party has only
increased. Whether one believes that the Party has manipulated or
fooled the gullible citizens of China is immaterial—the Party has been
remarkably successful in earning the trust and support of its citizens.
For three decades, the United States attempted to influence
changes in China’s human rights policies without success. The United
States was unable to influence China, although for parts of this period,
China was an emerging economy and nascent trader while the United
States was the undisputed top military and economic power in the
world. Now that China the tiger cub has grown into China the tiger, it
seems improbable that the United States can influence meaningful
changes in an area that is so sensitive and central to the Party’s power
in China. For example, take the issue of human rights in Xinjiang. This
subject has been the focus of a sustained critical effort by a large group
of nations. A total of thirty-nine countries, including the United States
and the EU, have jointly condemned China’s treatment of Uighurs in
the United Nations.270 The United States has issued numerous specific
trade bans on import products produced by forced labor from
Xinjiang.271 Yet, on September 26, 2020, Xi merely shrugged and
brushed aside U.S. and EU condemnation in a conference in western
China when he stated that his policy in Xinjiang was a “‘totally correct’
success, and vowed more efforts to imprint Chinese national identity

Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang and the
Recent Developments in Hong Kong, Delivered by Germany on Behalf of 39
Countries, supra note 249.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 159–63.
270
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‘deep in the soul’ of Uighurs and other largely Muslim minorities.” 272
Now that China has the second largest economy in the world and is
projected to soon surpass the United States as the world’s largest
economy, it seems unrealistic to believe that the United States can
influence any meaningful change on such a powerful and skillful
adversary when similar efforts have failed during the past three
decades.
A large coalition of foreign nations imposing trade bans on
imports from Xinjiang might create greater pressure on China, but
China, a skillful and effective litigant in the WTO, will likely challenge
the Xinjiang tariffs in the WTO and succeed. China has already won a
WTO case that rejected the first wave of U.S. tariffs and will likely win
this lawsuit as well. While the United States has shown disdain for the
WTO, the same cannot be said for the EU, which took China’s side
against the United States in challenging the first wave of Trump’s
tariffs. The legal requirements of the WTO will impede the formation
of a U.S.-led coalition to ban trade with China based on forced labor
and human rights abuses.
The United States must now come to the sober realization that
influencing China to make meaningful changes in its human rights
policies is unrealistic. Despite all of the U.S. efforts over the past three
decades, China’s human rights policies are presently more restrictive
than at any time during the past three decades. The more powerful
China becomes, the stronger the controls the Party exercises over all
aspects of Chinese society. Rather than object to these controls, most
citizens in China exhibit a very high level of trust in the Party and their
support only grows in reaction to U.S. criticism of China.273 Given
these developments, U.S. criticism of China’s human rights policies
can realistically serve two goals. U.S. criticism of China’s human rights
policies can be used to justify tough actions against China in other
areas, such as trade, the environment, or military ambitions. This use
of human rights seems to have been the approach of the Trump
Administration and may also become the approach of the Biden
Chris Buckley, Brushing Off Criticism, Xi Calls Policies in Xinjiang “Totally
Correct,”
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
14,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-xinjiang.html.
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Administration. Otherwise, U.S. criticism of human rights in China will
likely serve a symbolic purpose only. Only with this sober recognition
will the United States and the Biden Administration be able to
approach its relationship with China now and in the future with
realistic expectations.
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